In the context of increased scrutiny of humanitarian assistance over the past decade, issues around the accountability of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) -and the perceived lack thereof -have been discussed widely and frequently. This reflects the recognition of both the increased relevance of INGOs and of the underlying problems associated with their role. Donor agencies in particular have become increasingly concerned with the accountability of the operational agencies they fund, who in return have put in place elaborate evaluation processes and systems. What characterizes these approaches and how are they affecting the ways agencies operate and pursue their humanitarian missions? Were agencies successful in addressing accountability deficits and in correcting the respective incentives towards positive change in humanitarian action? When examining the prevailing practices of major humanitarian INGOs, this research identified not only a general absence of critical self-reflection and meaningful concern over achieved impact, but also a remarkable resistance of the same dilemmas that triggered the call for an 'accountability revolution' in the first place. Highlighting considerable weaknesses in the governance of these INGOs, this article confirms also a growing frustration among humanitarian professionals themselves that, while much is measured and evaluated, it is rarely the actual impact of their work. Instead it is apparent that evaluation as it mostly takes place today reflects primarily the needs of donors; is irrelevant for serious organizational learning and programming efforts; adds considerably to the burden of local staff and partners; and does little to shed light on the roles, influence and impact of INGOs as central actors in humanitarian action and protection.
INTRODUCTION "Evaluation as it is used today is the worst way to learn: It is done post-program (often after the new program has started), it is unhelpful, doesn't address what produces good programming, focuses on attribution and doesn't delve into the ambiguities of relationships;
They organizations respond and report to, what are the professional standards under which they operate? Who is responsible for ensuring that these organizations are actually fulfilling expressed public interest goals? How can it be ensured that they fulfill their role, including to explore alternative policy agendas for addressing structural failures prevalent in humanitarian action?
Ultimately, the roles and identity of INGOs are shrouded in indeterminacystarting with their names defined a contrario from governmental counterparts, yet being fully involved in government-led operational and policy responses to conflict. Even as efforts are being made to establish a more structured approach to humanitarian protection, INGOs remain an evasive actor that benefits from the freedom of private social enterprises while fulfilling major public policy roles in conflict situations which would otherwise require significant accountability frameworks.
The primary objective of this study was to assess the various evaluation practices of major INGOs in the humanitarian and peacebuilding fields, and to examine how these are affecting the accountability and governance frameworks of these organizations. This involved looking at formal and informal methods and metrics, internal and external accountability and other relationships between actors in the aid industry. This analysis is part of broader efforts to gain a better understanding of the role that humanitarian actors, in particular INGOs, play in transforming alternative policy agendas. To date the general importance of nonprofit organizations in humanitarian assistance is widely acknowledged, yet the actual impact of their work remains difficult to evaluate. From a research perspective, this lack of strategic accountability only enhances the scientific interest in the unusual organizational construct of the 'humanitarian INGO' upon which so many lives depend. As part of this research's broader investigation of evaluation practices, the authors reviewed the various methodologies used by INGOs in the humanitarian and peacebuilding fields, distinguishing between methodologies that primarily focus on outputs (to measure performance) and those that aim at identifying outcomes (to assess impact) of the organizations' activities. Impact evaluation is understood as a systematic effort to identify the effects of activities on individuals, households, and institutions attributable to a policy or program (see Blomquist 2003) . If undertaken seriously, this is generally recognized as a difficult exercise -even under best of circumstances. In the context of conflict or humanitarian emergencies, the challenges are multiplied which explains why genuine attributions of the impact of material outputs on the life of a community rarely take place. Yet even more difficulties exist for the evaluation of policy initiatives that focus on often complex, multifaceted and long(er) term political and social processes as they are of particular interest for this study.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND INGO ACCOUNTABILITY

PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS OF MEASURING INGO IMPACT
Assessing prevailing approaches
Essentially all donor-funded programs now require layers of reporting and evaluation processes -by project, sector, country and other dimensions -feeding also a large industry of evaluation experts and consultants. Despite the specific challenges involved in conflict settings, the evaluation frameworks as they are being applied by INGOs appear to be broadly based on standard methodologies -while taking into account specific aspects of context, actors and dynamics of conflict settings. Evaluation frameworks often involve two parts, namely the standard methodology and the substantive piece of the evaluation based on the specific sector or type of situation (see IFAD 2003 , IFAD 2004 , Purdon 2001 ).
Many of the organizations reviewed here have over the years commissioned, drafted and implemented their own modified methodologies for impact evaluation, as did independent fora such as ALNAP (for non-governmental agencies in humanitarian action) or the OECD-DAC (for government donor agencies), including a whole range of guidelines and accompanying research. Despite the plethora of instruments outlining basic methodologies for general evaluation of (mostly government-run) policy initiatives, there seems to be very little that speaks specifically to humanitarian and conflict settings;
substantive pieces of evaluation that apply these methodologies to these contexts, it seems, have yet to emerge (see Purdon 2001 , and others since). In the non-profit sector, there is a wealth of research on how to influence policy, but not as much information on substantive methodologies.
Overall, with only a few organizations looking specifically into measuring policy impact for humanitarian or conflict settings, much needs to be learned and developed still Operational improvements and institutional learning as key aspects and rationales for evaluation frameworks are mostly achieved through internal and informal reporting.
Some professionals refer to the culture of "self-accountability" by which INGO professionals relay basically on themselves as individuals to evaluate the quality of their work -underlining also the importance that the selection and hiring of the 'right' staff has for these organizations. Self-accountability processes are nevertheless supplemented with informal, ad hoc and often undocumented policy processes through which individual feedback and lessons are shared and transmitted to the rest of the team. This seems to confirm findings of related NGO research that observed that accountability in NGO practice tends to emphasize "upward" and "external" (functional) accountability to donors over the short-term, while remaining comparatively underdeveloped for "downward" and "internal" (strategic) accountability mechanisms in the long term (see Ebrahim 2003 ).
Overall, current practices of evaluation approaches seem to largely rest on the plain evidence of the delivery of assistance, the INGO's recognition as belonging to a 'humanitarian' professional culture, and the organizations ability to operate in complex 
Identifying difficulties in measuring
On the face of it, there seems to be more literature on the difficulties involved in measuring policy impact during crises than on how to actually do those evaluations successfully. There also is literature criticizing the very idea of evaluating policy impact, with the main objections being a) the lack of duplicability, i.e. that results would not be transferable to other policy issues and contexts due to the limited and not efficient measurement; b) the lack of a counterfactual, i.e. that policy effects in the absence of a comparative group can not sufficiently exclude the possibility of change occurring without the specific policy initiative; and c) that impact evaluation would only expedite the policy-making process at the expense of a genuine participation of the affected populations (see SIDA 2005 , Thomas 2004 ).
Beyond those objections on principle, other difficulties in undertaking policy impact evaluations are quite complex and include, to name the most important constraints: the lack and quality of baseline data and needs assessments; inadequate time and timing to access and follow up with populations; pressures from donors and the media; attribution and the distinction between short-term vs. long-term affects; and the challenge of balancing neutrality with advocacy. distinction, the success of any organization would need to be measured by assessing both its ability to deliver on humanitarian outputs and by its successful articulation of its work in terms of the social values the organization claims to advance.
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS ON INGO GOVERNANCE
Which of these missions is the dominant one would depend on the relative charitable versus transformative focus and ambitions of an organization: The more charitable an organization is (e.g. to save children from immediate starvation), the more limited is its ability to articulate social values based on these operations and to build a constituency among donors. Inversely, the more transformative an INGO's mission might be (e.g. to focus on the response and prevention of future starvation), the more
challenging it is to demonstrate actual impact -given the strong influence of other external political, social and environmental factors.
Most INGOs seem to be located somewhere between the extreme poles of the spectrum, with a tendency to naturally emphasize the social mission for their work in order to attract the interest of donors -while nevertheless going about producing charitable outputs that can be measured through standard business evaluation processes.
This apparent disconnect of social missions with business missions (especially as organizations grow) is seen as central to the inability, and unwillingness of INGOs to undertake a meaningful probing for their programs' effective outcomes.
As the review of current practices in this field reveals, this particular, slightly schizophrenic feature of modern INGOs appears so common that it transpires into the definition of the 'humanitarian' field as such: A sector of activities dealing with the immediate requirements for the survival and dignity of populations (as charitable outputs) while claiming to address the protection needs of vulnerable groups in terms of broader human rights norms and humanitarian law (as a social mission). As a result, organizations are generally held accountable for their immediate (business) outputs -on the other hand, their social mission and broader impact remains largely cloaked in indeterminacy.
Reputation and brand identity
NGOs in general are evaluated more on their reputation than on any objective assessment of their work and impact. Reputation is therefore identified by the senior management as a key asset to be enhanced -primarily, by marketing (including branding) and policy development. Public campaigns effectively serve both the advocacy goals of an organization and the maintenance of its profile and public recognition as an organization that matters for humanitarian ideals. 
Success and survival
The global context of humanitarian action and of organizations working in this area is obviously one where -at any moment in time -the lives of millions of men, women and children are threatened by war, drought, illnesses and poverty, thereby creating an infinite pool of individuals who would need to be saved. As a consequence, the satisfactory demonstration by any humanitarian actor that it is fulfilling its mission does not really depend on any measurable number or proportion of children 'saved' (a hundred, a thousand, or a hundred thousand…). Instead its 'success' effectively depends more on the organization's ability to present itself credibly as a 'savior of children ' -i.e In contrast to what elsewhere is described as a dilemma between immediate needs versus long term solutions, the critical choice INGOs are facing from an accountability perspective might rather be regarding the extent to which they may give in to a temptation of 'trading' the production of actual outputs against communicating their overall social mission. At its worst (but not unlikeliest), the importance of publicizing children that need to be saved (in support of the INGO's social mission) might supersede that of its actual efforts to save these children (as the INGO's main nominal charitable output).
FRAMEWORKS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF INGO ACCOUNTABILITY
In the current debate around humanitarian assistance and its reform, accountability represents a growing set of concerns in terms of the management of humanitarian and peacebuilding operations, particularly in the eyes of institutional donors. Clearly accountability frameworks are not yet well established and industry standards or models are still insufficiently developed and agreed. Accountability, as understood here, is argued to be driven by three sources: external pressure, internal strategy and adherence to core organizational values (see Raynard 2000) . There also is a renewed emphasis on humanitarian professionalism, its historical backgrounds and possible modern iterations and models in the discourse over the future of humanitarianism (see Walker 2004) . To date, however, professional obligations are not enshrined in international legal frameworks -and while human rights and international humanitarian standards are, they are not and can not be enforced outside of INGOs' internal management structures. In effect, as a senior program staff at Human Rights Watch stated in 2007, "We question ourselves much more than our accountability structure does". As a consequence, some
INGOs are developing and professionalizing their systems from social accountability towards enforced business accountability.
Inherent immunity and incentives
The underlying imbalance in the missions of INGOs as described above has essentially a corresponding dilemma in two types of accountability: A business accountability that demands formal structures of reporting, management and feedback; and a social accountability that remains far more ambiguous in its implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
As such, an organization can be extremely successful in terms of communication, yet perform very poorly in terms of actual outcome and impact. INGOs 'get away' with this as long as their donors and benefactors decide to give more attention to organizational values than to the actual organizational impact. In fact, donors for the most part do not only seem to not mind the lack of measurable impact of those agencies they fund -they don't seem to be that strongly interested in getting it documented either, suggesting that the status quo is broadly acceptable to them. In the words of one NGO representative,
"Would an NGO admit to DFID that the four million dollars did not have a large impact? And then, would DFID publicly admit that it wasted millions on an NGO? No, neither would admit it. They are complicit."
The benefits of the current mode of largely inconsequential evaluation practices are also reinforced by the tendency of INGOs to select highly communicative and 'fashionable' issues (such as fighting poverty, ending impunity, preventing genocide)
where progress and impact are difficult to measure, rather than other equally noble issues for which they might actually be more qualified, better positioned and able to be more concretely evaluated. At its worst, such contortion is capable to foster institutional environments where the success of INGOs becomes effectively detached from any evaluation of either outputs or outcomes. Especially prone would be cases where donor support is provided on political grounds in response to public pressure as symbolic problem-solving. Bypassing these, however, comes at the cost of decreased business accountability.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Donors are increasingly putting pressure on the INGOs they fund to conduct performance and impact evaluations. This trend has led to an ever increasing sector of activities solely 2. Evaluations are often not useful.
3. Evaluations are often not used.
4. New evaluation materials will help little as existing ones are not enforced.
5. Evaluation criteria are often inappropriate.
6. Impact evaluation as the one really meaningful approach is almost never done, and is just at the beginning of its development.
Concrete suggestions to improve the conditions and incentives for impact evaluation as they emerged from our interviews range from broad and strategic to specific and technical. Individually and collectively, they would go a long way in preparing the ground for a transformative shift towards greater accountability, transparency and impact of the work done by INGOs as key actors in international affairs. 
Strategic Recommendations
